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Abstract
The Netherlands is among the top spenders on health in the OECD.
We document the life-cycle profile, concentration and persistence of this
expenditure using claims data covering both curative and long-term care
expenses for the full Dutch population. Spending on health care is strongly
concentrated: the 1 per cent of individualswith the highest levels of expenditure
account for one-quarter of the aggregate in any one year. Averaged over three
years, the top 1 per cent still account for more than a fifth of the total, indicating
a very high degree of persistence in the largest expenses. Spending on long-
term care, which amounts to one-third of all expenditure on health care, is
even more concentrated: the top 1 per cent account for more than half of
total spending on this type of care. Average expenditure rises steeply with age
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and even more so with proximity to death. Spending on individuals in their
last year of life absorbs one-tenth of aggregate health care expenditure. In a
given year, spending on health care is highly skewed toward individuals with
lower incomes. Average expenditure on the poorest fifth is more than three
times that on the richest fifth.
Policy points
 In any given year, health spending in the Netherlands is highly skewed
towards poorer individuals. Those in the bottom of the income distribution
spend two to three times what those at the top spend, at all stages of the
life cycle.
 Health expenditures rising steeply with age and proximity to death imply
substantial intrapersonal redistribution across the life cycle. Nevertheless,
health care spending in the last year of life only accounts for 4.4 per cent
of total medical spending (excluding long-term care) and 5.6 per cent of
total health care spending (including long-term care).
 Spending on health care is highly concentrated on a small share of the
population and is strongly persistent over time.
 Public spending on long-term care is high and is even more concentrated
and persistent.
 The high concentration and persistence imply substantial interpersonal
redistribution.
I. Introduction
The Netherlands is among the top spenders on health across the world and,
since 2008, health expenditure has risen more steeply than in almost any other
high-income country.1 There is universal coverage not only of medical care
expenses but also of long-term care costs, with both financed from compulsory
income-related contributions. Inconsistent with the fabled Dutch practice of
each picking up his own tab, the bill for health care is largely split according to
ability to pay. High and growing medical and long-term care expenditures may
strain the solidarity that underpins this social insurance system.2 We document
the extent to which spending on medical and long-term care is concentrated on
the highest-cost patients and examine how spending is distributed in relation
to income using claims data for the full population for the period 2009–11.
Further, we examine the persistence of individual expenditures from year to
year in order to assess the extent to which public financing is insuring against
1OECD, 2015.
2SER, 2012.
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fluctuating health expenses, as opposed to redistributing towards individuals
with consistently high expenses.
There are three main reasons why the distribution of health care
expenditures in the Netherlands may be of interest from an international
perspective. First, the country combines universal compulsory coverage with
competition between private providers of insurance, aswell as private provision
of medical and long-term care services. It is interesting to consider the
distribution of publicly-financed health care achieved under such a mixed
system in the context of developments both in the US, where universal
insurance offered through a regulated market is beginning to operate alongside
private provision of care, and in tax-financed national health systems, such as
that in the UK, that are responding to funding pressures by experimenting with
private provision.
Second, the Netherlands is peculiar in mandating very comprehensive
universal coverage of long-term care costs. This may impact not only on
the level of health expenditure (spending on long-term care is particularly
high), but also on its distribution. Long-term care expenditures are likely to be
concentrated on the oldest old and to strongly affect the concentration of total
health spending. While ageing electorates are likely to press for increased
public financing of long-term care costs, ageing of the population raises
concerns about the economic viability of doing so. In this context, we examine
the contribution that long-term care expenditures make to the concentration
and persistence of total health spending.
Third, our analysis is based on data on personal health expenditures
recorded in insurance claims for the full population. The comprehensiveness
and accuracy of these data set them above what is available in most countries,
facilitating analyses that would otherwise be infeasible. We can break the data
down into different types of care, examine the correlation in expenditures for
the same individuals over a number of years and link the data with tax records
to obtain a highly accurate picture of how health spending is distributed in
relation to income.
No previous study has documented the concentration and persistence of
medical and long-term care expenditures for the whole Dutch population. The
age profile of medical spending in a single year has been described in Vektis
(2011) and lifetime medical expenditures have been simulated from claims
data for two-thirds of the population by Wong et al. (2016). The latter study
claims that lifetime expenditures are much less concentrated than are those
for any one year, implying that cross-sectional analysis grossly overstates the
interpersonal redistribution effected by public health insurance. Inequality in
the distribution of health expenditures is reduced – to a substantial degree
according to the simulations – when the time horizon is stretched. We do not
attempt to estimate lifetime expenditures but we do examine the persistence
in expenditures over a three-year period using data that are both more recent
C© 2016 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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and more comprehensive with respect to population coverage and health care
expenses included.3 In addition, we examine the distribution of health spending
by income.
Claims data for 13 per cent of the Dutch population in 1999 have been used
to estimate that 10 per cent of total health spending is concentrated in the last
year of life.4 We update this estimate using more recent and comprehensive
data, and extend the analysis to expenses incurred in the last three years of life.
Analyses of the distribution of health spending in the Netherlands by disease
have revealed that mental disorders are the most expensive group, accounting
for more than a fifth of total expenditures on health and welfare.5 There is
evidence that the utilisation of health services in the Netherlands is higher
among those with lower incomes,6 but this seems to be entirely attributable to
the income gradient in the burden of disease and disability.7
This paper contributes by documenting the concentration and persistence
of not only medical expenses but also long-term care expenditures in the
Netherlands. Only one study has previously used claims data to examine long-
term care expenditures for the entire population and that study focused on the
association of these expenditures with age and proximity to death.8 We are
the first to examine the distribution of medical spending after a major reform
in 2006 that radically altered health financing by bringing the richest third of
the population, who could previously opt for private health insurance, into the
social health insurance system that collects contributions in relation to income
and delivers a regulated benefit package. This reform increased risk pooling
and the potential for interpersonal redistribution. Establishing the effectiveness
of social insurance in these respects requires good evidence on the distribution
of medical spending by income and its persistence over time.
We find that health expenditures are highly concentrated: one-quarter of
aggregate spending in a year is on the top percentile of the distribution. The
degree of concentration falls only marginally when the data are averaged over
three years – the top 1 per cent still account formore than a fifth of the total. This
points to a very high degree of persistence. Indeed, 60 per cent of individuals
in the top quintile of the spending distribution in one year are also at the top
of the distribution the following year, and 56 per cent remain there after two
years. Both concentration and persistence are even greater for expenditure
on long-term care. Remarkably, the 1 per cent of individuals with the highest
long-term care expenditures account for more than half of total spending on
3Wong et al. (2016) use data from 1997 to 2005 that excluded the one-third of the population with the
highest incomes and did not cover long-term care expenses.
4Polder, Barendregt and van Oers, 2006.
5RIVM, 2013.
6Van Doorslaer et al., 2000 and 2006.
7RIVM, 2007.
8De Meijer et al., 2011.
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this type of care. The high concentration of health expenditure on relatively
few individuals is partly driven by the strong increase in average expenditure
with age. In the whole population, the top 5 per cent account for 60 per cent of
aggregate spending, but this share of spending is just over 35 per cent for the
elderly (those aged 65 and above). One of the reasons for the difference is that
many of those at the top of the distribution are elderly. But this is not the entire
story. Restricting attention to individuals between the ages of 25 and 64, the top
5 per cent in the distribution still account for 60 per cent of total expenditure.
Rapidly-rising spending in the last months of life also contributes to the highly
concentrated nature of health expenditure. Spending on individuals in their last
year of life, who correspond to only 0.8 per cent of the population, absorbs
one-tenth of aggregate health care expenditure.
There is a strong reverse income gradient in the distribution of health
expenditure in a given year. On average, the poorest fifth of the population
consume health care resources that are three times more valuable than those
expended on the richest fifth. This is not simply attributable to higher health
spending and lower incomes among the elderly. The income gradient in
spending is even more pronounced among individuals aged 25–64 than it is
in the other age groups. It is likely that this reflects the impact of ill health
on both income and health care utilisation in this population of working-aged
individuals.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II provides
institutional background on health care financing and provision in the
Netherlands and documents trends in aggregate spending on health. Section III
describes the data sources used. Subsequently, we describe how medical and
long-term care expenditures are concentrated in the cross-section. We do this
by age and by proximity to death in Section IV and by level of spending
and by income in Section V. In Section VI, we examine the persistence of
expenditures over time. The final section concludes.
II. Health care and expenditure in the Netherlands
1. Health care system
a) Health care financing
Health and social care are mainly financed through two social insurance
schemes that are mandatory for the entire population. One of these pays for
curative care, including primary care and maternity care. It began in 1941
with coverage of the poor and has been extended to cover more groups until it
became compulsory for the entire population in 2006. The other programme,
which was introduced in 1968, finances long-term care for the elderly, care for
the disabled and institutional mental health care. Both schemes operate on the
pay-as-you-go principle.
C© 2016 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 1
Financing of social health and long-term care insurance, 2015 budgets
Health insurance Long-term care insurance
Earmarked contributions and premiums 83.5% 73.4%
Government subsidy 9.6% 17.6%
Cost sharing 7.1% 9.0%
Source: Zorgcijfers, 2015a.
Social health insurance for curative care is financed mainly by income-
related contributions (47 per cent of total revenue in 2015) and a community-
rated premium (36 per cent).9 The remainder comes from deductibles (7 per
cent) and from two tax-financed government subsidies that cover care for
children and home care (10 per cent) (see Table 1). There is a mandatory
annual deductible of €385, with an option to raise this to €885 (2016) in return
for a premium discount.10 Expenditures on primary care, maternity care, home
care, medical devices and the management of chronic conditions are excluded
from the deductible.
Social health insurance is organised as managed competition. Citizens
choose a health plan annually from those offered by competing private non-
profit insurers. The government specifies the services and products to be
covered by basic health plans. Insurers compete on the community-rated
premium and the service level (see footnote 9). They select health care
providers to be included in their network and negotiate with them on prices
(for some procedures). Insurers may not refuse applicants. There are implicit
cross-subsidies from low to high risks through the community rating, as well
as explicit cross-subsidies through a risk adjustment scheme. The latter do not
fully equalise the expected loss between groups and insurers are compensated
for their losses on some types of care at the end of the year.11
9Contributions are levied on all income, including pensions and benefits. The rate is 6.95 per cent of
earnings up to €51,974, with no additional payments on earnings above that threshold. The retired and the
self-employed pay a rate of 4.85 per cent (Zorgcijfers, 2015b). Community-rated premiums vary across
health plans offered by private insurers. Within a health plan, everyone pays the same premium, although a
discount of up to 10 per cent may be given to members of a group, which is usually defined by a common
employer. Premiums vary across health plans mainly in relation to the service level offered: the size of the
provider network, how the insurance company may be contacted and how claims may be submitted (van de
Ven and Schut, 2008).
10Rijksoverheid, 2016. The discount depends on the magnitude of the increase in the deductible and
varies between insurers. The average discount for increasing the deductible by €500 was €240 in 2014 (van
Winssen, van Kleef and van de Ven, 2015).
11Schut and van de Ven, 2011; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015.
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Long-term care insurance is financed through income-related contributions
(73 per cent),12 a subsidy financed from general government revenues
(18 per cent) and co-payments (9 per cent) (see Table 1).13 Co-payments are
related to the type and amount of care used, the recipient’s income and wealth
(excluding housing), and household composition.14 Long-term care insurance
covers expenditures on institutional care. It also covered expenditures on home
care in the past, but the financing of this care has been reformed recently:
domestic help (since 2007) as well as support with activities of daily living
and some personal care (since 2015) are now tax funded, while nursing and
most personal home care have been covered from social health insurance since
2015.
In 2014, 85 per cent of the population opted to take supplementary insurance
of expenses not covered by the social health insurance scheme, such as dental
care, optometry and physical therapy.15 This supplementary insurance rarely
covers more expensive treatment substitutes or pays for deductibles. Out-
of-pocket payments are made for care not covered through public health
insurance, including certain branded off-patent prescription drugs and over-
the-counter medicines. Private long-term care insurance is non-existent16 and
private expenditures on long-term care other than co-payments are limited.17
b) Health care provision
Hospitals are private non-profit organisations. Market entry is regulated but
there are only requirements concerning the profit status and the way in which
the organisation is governed.18 All health care professionals must be registered
and are employed by private non-profit organisations or are self-employed.
Three-quarters of medical specialists are organised in partnerships, which are
usually specific to a hospital and a specialty.19
General practitioners (GPs) receive an annual capitation. All other medics
are paid on a fee-for-service basis.20 Hospitals are paid an amount specific to
a Diagnosis Treatment Combination (DTC). The DTC classification is similar
12Contributions are 9.65 per cent of income up to €33,589, with no additional payments on earnings
above that threshold (Zorgcijfers, 2015b).
13Zorgcijfers, 2015a.
14CAK, 2015.
15Vektis, 2015.
16OECD, 2011.
17Jonker et al., 2007.
18Provision of a few procedures, including proton therapy and organ transplants, is limited to a small
number of accredited hospitals (Rijksoverheid, 2014; WTZI, 2015).
19Helderman et al., 2005.
20Integrated care for some groups of chronic patients that is organised by care groups has been financed
through bundled payments since 2012. These bundled payments cover all care for these patients, except for
inpatient care, drugs, durable medical equipment and diagnostics. Their level is negotiated between the care
groups and health insurers (Tsiachristas et al., 2013).
C© 2016 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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to US Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). DTC rates are negotiated between
hospitals and insurers for some procedures, the share of which is rising over
time.21 The rates for other procedures are set by the government.22 Medical
specialists received a fixed payment per DTC, which is set by the government
and was integrated in the DTC rate in 2015.23
Nursing homes and other institutional long-term care providers receive a
per diem rate that is set by the government and that depends on the type and
amount of care the patient is assessed to need. Home care providers are paid
on a fee-for-service basis and either negotiate hourly prices with the regional
single payer or bid for contracts with municipalities.24 Rather than receiving
in-kind home care from a formal provider, the person in need of care can opt to
receive cash that must be used to either compensate an informal carer (possibly
a relative) or pay a professional caregiver.25
GPs act as gatekeepers for all secondary and tertiary care financed through
social health insurance.26 For care covered through social long-term care
insurance, access is determined by independent assessors, with eligibility
dependent upon the health status and disability of the applicant.27
2. Trends in aggregate health expenditure
Aggregate health spending is documented in the National Health Accounts
assembled by Statistics Netherlands.28 We concentrate here on expenditure
on personal health care, which excludes spending on administration. From
the left-hand panel of Figure 1, it can be observed that total expenditure on
personal health increased from 7.6 per cent to 9.8 per cent of GDP between
1972 and 1982, and then remained at around that proportion over the next
two decades. After fiscal restraints were relaxed from 2001, the percentage of
GDP that is spent on personal health care increased by a third over the next
13 years, to reach 13.3 per cent by 2013. As a result, the Netherlands is now
the country with the highest level of spending on health care in the world
after the US.29 Much of the increase in spending since 2001 was the result of
21The procedures for which DTC rates were negotiated accounted for 34 per cent of total hospital
expenditures in 2009–11, rising to 70 per cent from 2012. Total expenditure on these procedures was
capped at the hospital (and aggregate) level until 2012 and since then has been capped at the aggregate level
(Schut and Varkevisser, 2013).
22Schut and Varkevisser, 2013.
23Oostenbrink and Rutten, 2006; Schut and Varkevisser, 2013.
24Home care providers may be for-profit organisations even when revenue is solely from social long-term
care insurance.
25Bakx et al., 2015.
26Helderman et al., 2005.
27Staatscourant, 2014.
28CBS, 2016.
29OECD, 2015.
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FIGURE 1
Personal health care expenditure
Percentage of GDP Per-capita amount (2014 dollars) 
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Note:Medical expenditure includes spending on hospital care, primary care, professional services, medicine,
medical devices, vocational rehabilitation, prevention, supporting organisations and other medical care.
Long-term care expenditure includes spending on long-term care for the elderly and care for the disabled.
The definition of expenditures changed in 1998, which decreased expenditures by 0.4 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CBS (2016).
a greater propensity to use hospital care, as well as the introduction of new
technologies.30
Expenditure on personal health care can be disaggregated into spending on
medical care and spending on long-term care. The former includes spending
on hospital care, primary care, professional services, medicines and medical
devices, all of which are covered from social health insurance and are included
in the claims data we analyse below. Also included in medical expenditure
is spending on vocational rehabilitation, prevention, supporting organisations
and other medical care. These are not financed from social insurance and
are not included in the micro data analysed. Expenditure on long-term care
includes spending on institutional care and home care for the elderly and the
disabled, which is covered by social long-term insurance and other schemes
and is included in the micro claims data.
As a percentage ofGDP, expenditures onmedical care and on long-termcare
have moved in parallel since 1972. In 2013, spending on medical care reached
8.9 per cent of GDP ($4,368 per person) and long-term care expenditure
amounted to a very substantial 4.4 per cent of GDP ($2,149 per person).
Expenditure on long-term care for the elderly is the highest among the OECD
countries and almost 2.5 times the OECD average.31 Since 2001, per-capita
expenditure on both types of care has increased by around 40 per cent in real
terms (right-hand panel of Figure 1). Due to the lower level of spending on
30De Meijer et al., 2013.
31OECD, 2011.
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TABLE 2
Expenditure on personal health care, by type and payer
1998 2006 2014
Expenditure types
Long-term care 33.0% 33.5% 34.2%
Hospital care 29.8% 29.9% 32.5%
Outpatient drugs 10.1% 9.2% 6.5%
Professional services 17.8% 18.3% 17.8%
Other health care 9.3% 9.1% 9.0%
Payers
Social insurance 69.1% 80.1% 81.6%
Private insurance 14.5% 4.8% 4.3%
Government 6.3% 7.2% 7.8%
Out-of-pocket 7.5% 5.6% 4.6%
Other 2.5% 2.3% 1.7%
Total personal health care
Expenditure in billions (2014 dollars) 62.1 90.0 106.2
Note: Professional services include GP care, dental care, paramedical care and mental health care. Other
health care includes medical devices, medical transportation, expenditures abroad, and other medical and
long-term care. ‘Social insurance’ refers to expenditures paid for by compulsory insurance. ‘Government’
refers to expenditures that the government pays for directly. Out-of-pocket payments do not include
payments that count toward the public health insurance deductible. ‘Other’ payer refers to payments made
by corporations, international organisations and foreigners.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CBS (2016).
long-term care, the difference in the absolute amounts of expenditure on the
two categories has widened.
Table 2 shows the fractions of spending on personal health care by the type
of expenditure and the source of finance. In 2014, around one-third of total
personal health spending was on long-term care and this fraction has remained
roughly constant since 1998. Another near third of spending is on hospital care,
with this fraction having increased by 3 percentage points since 1998. This
share is comparable to those in the US, France and Switzerland.32 Spending
on professional services – payments to GPs, dentists, paramedics and mental
health professionals – accounts for 17.8 per cent of the total. The decrease in
the share of spending on outpatient prescription drugs, which in 2014 is only
6.5 per cent of the total, is the result of generic substitution and of financing
some expensive outpatient drugs through hospital budgets.
The mix of health financing has changed more markedly in the period
1998–2014 than has the distribution of spending across types of care, as shown
in Table 2. Between 1998 and 2006, the share of expenditure paid through
32OECD, 2015.
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public health insurance increased to reach four-fifths of the total, pushing the
contribution of private insurance to only one-twentieth. This is the result of
the 2006 reform that made public health insurance mandatory for the entire
population and not only for the two-thirds with the lowest incomes. The share
of government financing has increased to reach 7.8 per cent, partly as a result
of transferring financial responsibility for domestic help from public long-term
care insurance to municipalities. Reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments
has fallen markedly and they contributed only one-twentieth of total health
financing in 2014. This is the lowest proportion among OECD countries,33
although payments that are part of the social insurance deductible are not
included. Private financing through OOP payments and insurance combined
contributed less than one-tenth of the total.
III. Data
We analyse the concentration and persistence of personal health care
expenditures using individual-level data for the full population in the period
2009–11. Data on medical care expenditures are obtained from claims that are
approved and paid by insurers operating within the mandatory social health
insurance system. These data, which are collated and administered by a private
agency (Vektis), cover the entire population of individuals who are required
to hold public health insurance.34 This excludes only the military, foreign
students below the age of 30 and individuals who have a moral objection –
usually founded on religious beliefs – to the purchase of health insurance.
Expenses paid by the patient in the form of a deductible are recorded in
the claims data. The data include expenditures on all services covered by
public health insurance: GP care, maternity care, hospital treatment, specialist
care, rehabilitation, pharmaceuticals, short-term mental health care, medical
devices and medical transport. For children (under 18 years old), expenditures
on physical therapy and dental care are also recorded.
Excluded are expenditures on services that are not covered by social
insurance. Hence, the cost of any medical treatment financed from
supplementary private insurance is not included. While 85 per cent of the
population have this cover,35 it financed only 4 per cent of total personal
health care expenditure in 2014 (see Table 2). Supplementary private insurance
mainly covers dental care and physical therapy, which are likely to be lower-
cost treatments. Consequently, it is likely that we are missing expenditures
toward the bottom of the distribution and will slightly overestimate the extent
to which expenditures are concentrated at the top. Also missing are OOP
33OECD, 2015.
34Five per cent of the population are covered through a proxy holder and are excluded from the data set.
The data are weighted to allow for this omission and ensure population representativeness.
35Vektis, 2015.
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payments other than those that count toward the public insurance deductible.
Again, it is likely that this results in some exaggeration of the degree to which
individuals with particularly high levels of expenditure account for a large
share of the total amount spent on medical care.
Data on long-term care are obtained from the Central Administration Office
of the long-term care insurance scheme (CAK). The data include the use of
– and expenditures on – institutional care and home care. Care provided to
children (under 18 years old) is not recorded, and there is no reliable estimate of
total spending on long-term care forminors. Cash benefits paid in compensation
for informal care, which account for 9 per cent of total social long-term care
expenditures in 2013,36 are not recorded in these data.
For institutional care, the data record the units (days) of utilisation received
by an individual over a year. The corresponding tariff paid to the provider and
set by the government depends only on the type and amount of care for which
the person is eligible. For most episodes, this tariff can be determined from
the information provided in the data.37 We multiply units of utilisation by the
tariffs to get annual expenditure on institutional care for each individual. The
data record the number of hours of home care of a particular type – for example,
nursing – received by each individual each month but not the negotiated price.
In the absence of individual-specific price data, we multiply the hours of care
received by each individual by an average price for that type of care.38
The two expenditure data sets are linked at the individual level by
Statistics Netherlands using a unique identification number recorded on all
administrative records. This number is issued to all citizens upon mandatory
registration with the municipality of residence, usually at birth or at the time
of immigration. In order to describe the distribution of personal health care
expenditures by income, we make use of the link of the two expenditure data
sets to the tax records for the full population.39 The measure of income adopted
is gross household income equivalised to take account of household size and
structure.40 In order to calculate expenditures by age and proximity to death,
36CBS, 2016.
37For individuals for whom the type and amount of care have not been specified, we use the tariff from
the previous or next episode of care. If there is a single episode for which no tariff is available, then we use
the average tariff over the population using institutional care.
38For care covered through the social long-term care insurance scheme, utilisation is registered by type
of care (nursing, personal care, and support) whereas prices are set per sub-type of care (for example,
basic, extra and special for nursing care) (NZA, 2009, 2010 and 2011). We calculate a year-specific
price per type of care as a (volume-) weighted average of the respective sub-types (CBS, 2015). For
domestic care covered through the Social Support Act, prices differ betweenmunicipalities.We calculate the
(population-) weighted median price per year. Any bias from taking averages is likely to be small because
the price differences are limited and the share of the population that uses long-term care is small.
39Income information is not available for 5 per cent of the population. These individuals are included in
all analyses except, obviously, for that of expenditure by income.
40Equivalised household income = Gross household income / (No. of adults + 0.7×No. of children)0.7
(Citro and Michael, 1995).
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the expenditure and income data are linked with data on gender, date of birth
and date of death taken from the Municipal Registry. Statistics Netherlands
provided one of us (Bakx) with remote fingerprint-protected access to a secure
server holding the individual-level linked administrative data.
To facilitate comparison with analyses for other countries presented in
this issue, all monetary amounts have been converted to 2014 prices using
the Dutch Consumer Price Index for 2009–1441 and to US dollars using the
average exchange rate in 2014.42
IV. Health expenditure over the life cycle
1. Average expenditure by age
Before examining the concentration of health expenditures – the extent towhich
relatively few high-cost patients account for a large share of total spending –
and the persistence of expenditures – the extent to which a high-cost patient
in one year also incurs high costs in the next – it is worth making clear how
strongly expenditures are correlated with age. The concentration of spending
is, to some extent, a concentration on the old and serial correlation will partly
be driven by persistently high spending in old age. Figure 2 shows per-capita
annual expenditure on personal health care by age and gender. The increase
FIGURE 2
Average annual expenditures on personal health care per person, by age, gender and
type of expenditure, 2009–11 (US$ 2014 prices)
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Note: Calculated from Vektis and CAK data pooled across years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Number of
observations is 47,309,246. Medical expenditure is all spending on personal health care excluding that
on long-term care. Long-term care expenditures are not recorded for ages 0–17.
41CBS, 2016.
42Eurostat, 2015.
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FIGURE 3
Percentages of total personal health care expenditure and of population, by age,
2009–11
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Note: Calculated from Vektis and CAK data pooled across years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Number of
observations is 47,309,246. Health expenditure is all spending on medical care and long-term care for
ages 18–99 and spending on medical care for ages 0–17.
in spending above the age of 70 is staggering. On average, $42,729 is spent
on women aged 95. This is almost eight times the $5,439 spent on the average
woman aged 65. Average spending on a 95-year-old male is almost six times
the average amount spent on a 65-year-old male. The highest-cost cases tend
to be very old and so these individuals will account disproportionately for the
concentration of total spending at the top of the distribution.
Of course, the share of the population at very old ages is small and so
spending on these groups does not necessarily account for a large fraction of
total health expenditure. As is evident fromFigure 3, after infanthood, the share
of total health expenditure spent on single-year age groups generally rises, and
differs from the respective population share, until the age of 82. The peak in
the spending share at ages 62–65 is due to the increased population share of
this post-Second-World-War baby-boom cohort. Every single-year age group
between the ages of 74 and 88 consumes at least 1.5 per cent of total health
expenditure, and none has a population share of more than 0.7 per cent. From
the age of 90, the share of spending falls rapidly despite the continued rise in
spending per capita because of the very steep decline in the population share
of the oldest old. Individuals aged 95 and above account for 1.5 per cent of
total spending on personal health care, which is vastly disproportionate to the
population share of this group – 0.2 per cent.
The steep rise in average expenditure in old age is primarily driven by
spending on long-term care (see Figure 2). From the age of 79 (84), average
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FIGURE 4
Average annual medical care expenditure per person, by age, gender and type of
expenditure, 2009–11 (US$ 2014 prices)
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Note: Calculated from Vektis data pooled across years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Number of observations is
47,309,246. Hospital care expenditure includes expenditures on inpatient and outpatient care and medicine
that is prescribed and administered at the hospital. Medicine expenditure is for outpatient prescription
medicine.
long-term care expenditures on women (men) exceed average medical care
expenditures. For the oldest age group (95 and over), annual spending on long-
term care reaches $38,631 for the average woman and $28,479 for the average
man. These amounts are more than seven times and four times greater than the
respective expenditures on medical care. By far the greatest part of the health
care costs of the oldest old arises from long-term care needs. Long-term care
expenditures are considerably higher for the oldest women than for the oldest
men, possibly because women are more likely both to provide informal care
while their spouse is alive and to survive their spouse.43
The very large long-term care expenses in old age make it difficult to
observe the age profile of spending on medical care in Figure 2. In Figure 4,
we show average spending onmedical care by age and gender with a distinction
between spending on hospital care and other types of care. The former includes
both inpatient and outpatient care, as well as pharmaceuticals that are issued or
prescribed from a hospital. The age profile of medical costs displays a pattern
observed in many high-income countries. Costs are high in infanthood before
falling in childhood and adolescence. For females, there is a peak at 25–40 due
to motherhood. For both genders, costs rise steadily through middle age and
peak at 84. At this point, average medical spending reaches $7,086 for females
and $8,321 for males, which are 2.3 and 3.0 times the respective average over
all age groups. More is spent on females than on males between the ages of 15
43De Meijer et al., 2011.
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and 58. This is reversed in old age, possibly due to the higher male mortality
rate. The decline in mean medical spending at the oldest ages is likely to reflect
both selective mortality – those surviving into very old age are healthier – and
less intensive treatment of a given condition at very old ages.44
The fraction of medical expenditures that are incurred for hospital treatment
is highest for newborns (90 per cent). It rises again from middle age into old
age and peaks at 60 per cent at the age of 78 for females and at 66 per cent at
the age of 79 for males.
2. Health expenditure at the end of life
Average health spending on the elderly is high partly because of the positive
correlations between proximity to death and both age and health expenditure.
Table 3 shows that average expenditure in the calendar year of death is $30,659
– seven times average expenditure across the population. These end-of-life
expenditures are split roughly evenly between spending on medical care and
spending on long-term care. The 0.82 per cent of individuals who die in a
calendar year account for 5.6 per cent of total health expenditures in that year.
Over the last three calendar years of life (i.e. 2009–11 for those who died
in 2011), health expenditure reaches $99,730 on average, and long-term care
accounts for more than half of that amount.
Using the method of Hoover et al. (2002),45 average expenditure in the
last 12 months of life is estimated to be $51,321 – almost 12 times average
expenditure over a 12-month period (Table 3, bottom panel). Spending on
individuals in their last full year of life is 9.4 per cent of aggregate health
expenditure.46 This is somewhat higher than the 6.7 per cent estimated by De
Nardi et al. (this issue) for the US. The comparison suggests that the often-
heard claim that there is excessive spending on end-of-life care in the US may
not be well founded. However, the estimates are not directly comparable since
the US one is based on an assumption that average spending in the last year
of life is the same under and over the age of 65. As is clear from comparison
of the middle and right panels of Table 3, this assumption does not hold in the
Netherlands. Total expenditure in the last 12 months of life for those who die
aged 65 or over is $6,665 more than the equivalent spending for those dying
44Mackenbach et al., 2011.
45We restrict the sample to individuals who died in the observation year and regress health expenditures
on (i) the number of months the individual was alive in the calendar year, (ii) the number of months alive in
the calendar year squared and (iii) the square root of the number of months alive in the calendar year. The
estimated coefficients are used to predict average expenditure with the number of months alive in the last
calendar year set to 12.
46This is very close to the estimate of 10 per cent produced for the Netherlands in 1998–99 by Polder,
Barendregt and van Oers (2006) using data on exact spending in the last year of life for a third of the
population that are extrapolated to the remainder of the population.
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TABLE 3
Health expenditures in the last years of life
All ages Aged under 65 Aged 65 and over
Mean
(US$
2014
prices)
% of
aggregate
annual
spending
Mean
(US$
2014
prices)
% of
aggregate
annual
spending
Mean
(US$
2014
prices)
% of
aggregate
annual
spending
Last years of life (from
data)
Calendar year of death
Total health expenditure 30,659 5.6% 28,662 1.7% 31,088 10.2%
Medical expenditure 15,802 4.4% 22,925 1.7% 14,271 9.3%
Long-term care expenditure 14,858 8.0% 5,737 1.7% 16,817 11.0%
Second-to-last year
Total health expenditure 39,273 7.4% 30,950 1.9% 41,148 13.7%
Medical expenditure 15,721 4.5% 23,234 1.8% 14,029 9.3%
Long-term care expenditure 23,552 12.9% 7,715 2.2% 27,119 18.0%
Third-to-last year
Total health expenditure 29,798 5.6% 20,736 1.2% 31,976 10.6%
Medical expenditure 11,035 10.4% 14,169 1.1% 10,282 6.8%
Long-term care expenditure 18,762 3.2% 6,567 1.9% 21,694 14.4%
Sum of last three years
Total health expenditure 99,730 18.6% 80,348 4.8% 104,212 34.5%
Medical expenditure 42,558 12.0% 60,328 4.6% 38,582 25.5%
Long-term care expenditure 57,172 31.3% 20,020 5.8% 65,630 43.4%
Hoover et al. (2002) method
Final 12 months
Total health expenditure 51,321 9.4% 45,483 2.7% 52,508 17.2%
Medical expenditure 24,187 6.7% 35,926 2.7% 21,658 14.2%
Long-term care expenditure 27,134 14.6% 9,557 2.8% 30,850 20.2%
Note:Calculated fromVektis and CAK data pooled across years 2009, 2010 and 2011. For mean expenditure
across all ages, the number of observations is 388,026, 397,602 and 401,715 for the analyses in the calendar
year of death (all deaths in 2009–11), the second-to-last year (all deaths in 2010–12) and the third-to-last year
(all deaths in 2011–13), respectively. In the panel ‘Sum of last three years’, percentage figures give average
spending on individuals in the last three years of life as a percentage of aggregate annual expenditure.
For mean expenditures on decedents aged 65 and over (under 65), the number of observations is 320,422
(67,604), 326,602 (72,000) and 325,011 (76,704) for calendar year of death, the second-to-last year and the
third-to-last year, respectively.
under 65. Because of the much higher mortality rate in the elderly population,
the proportion of aggregate expenditure on this population in a calendar year
that is spent on the dying is six times the fraction of total expenditure spent
on those dying in the younger population. Average spending on medical care
in each of the three last years of life is considerably higher in the younger
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age group. This is more than offset, however, by much higher spending on
long-term care for elderly individuals close to death.
If the difference by age in end-of-life total health expenditures were the
same in the US as it is in the Netherlands, then the estimate of De Nardi et al.
(this issue) of the proportion of total health spending on individuals in their
last year of life would be biased upward.47 That would strengthen the finding
that end-of-life health expenditure is not atypically high in the US, at least
in comparison with a country that spends heavily on long-term care for the
elderly.
Using the Hoover method, we estimate that average health spending on
individuals aged 65 and over in their final 12 months before death is $52,508
in the Netherlands. This is almost 90 per cent of the $59,100 estimated by De
Nardi et al. (this issue) for the elderly population in the US using the same
method and also in 2014 prices. For both countries, health spending in the
last 12 months of life is estimated to be around 17 per cent of total health
expenditure on the population aged 65 and over. If there is excessive spending
on seniors in the last months of life in the US, then it would appear that
the same criticism could be levelled at the Dutch health system. But there is
an important difference in the type of care on which resources are expended
in the last year of life in the two countries. In the Netherlands, about three-
fifths of expenditure is on long-term care. In the US, only a quarter is on
nursing home care. The Netherlands is spending much more than the US on
long-term care of the elderly in their last year of life – average expenditure
of $30,850 compared with $20,900.48 But spending on medical treatment
of the elderly in the last 12 months of life in the Netherlands – $21,658
on average – is substantially less than the respective expenditure in the US,
which is slightly less than $38,200 on average. This discrepancy suggests,
without the data being of sufficient detail to confirm, that considerably more
resources are expended in the US on trying to keep the dying elderly alive. In
the Netherlands, which has more comprehensive coverage of long-term care,
there is much greater expenditure on caring for elderly people nearing the end
of life.
Figure 5 reconfirms the important contribution that spending on long-term
care makes to the accumulation of health expenditure in the last year of life in
the Netherlands.
47Given the difference in the composition of end-of-life expenditures in the two countries (see next
paragraph), one might expect that the age gradients in these expenditures are not similar. The Dutch figures
show that end-of-lifemedical expenditures are consistently higher in the younger population. Since relatively
more is spent on medical care at the end of life in the US, this may result in higher mean end-of-life total
health expenditures in the younger population in that country.
48The US estimates in this sentence and the next were kindly provided by Eric French in personal
correspondence.
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FIGURE 5
Cumulative health expenditures in the last year of life, by months to death
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Note: Calculated from Vektis and CAK data pooled across years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Number of
observations is 388,026.
V. Concentration of health expenditures
1. Cross-sectional distribution
In a given year, most expenditure on personal health care is spent on a small
fraction of the population. In Table 4, we present the distribution of annual
expenditure computed from all observations pooled over the years 2009, 2010
TABLE 4
Distribution of annual health expenditures (US$ 2014 prices)
Total health expenditure Medical expenditure Hospital expenditure
Average
($)
% of total Average
($)
% of total Average
($)
% of total
All 4,398 100.0% 2,894 100.0% 1,552 100.0%
96–100% 52,766 60.0% 29,002 50.1% 19,126 61.6%
91–95% 12,351 14.0% 8,715 15.1% 4,896 15.8%
71–90% 3,961 18.0% 3,360 23.2% 1,448 18.7%
51–70% 1,112 5.1% 1,059 7.3% 285 3.7%
0–50% 255 2.9% 249 4.3% 8 0.2%
Note: Data are annual expenditures of individuals pooled over 2009–11. Number of observations is
47,309,246. Total health expenditure is the sum of expenditures onmedical care and long-term care.Medical
care in turn includes hospital care, outpatient medicine and other medical care, including professional
services.Hospital care includes inpatient and outpatient care andmedicine that is prescribed and administered
at the hospital.
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TABLE 5
Distribution of annual total health expenditures, by age (US$ 2014 prices)
Aged 0–24 Aged 25–64 Aged 65 and over
Average
($)
% of total Average
($)
% of total Average
($)
% of total
All 1,801 100.0% 3,406 100.0% 12,338 100.0%
96–100% 20,594 57.2% 40,229 59.1% 90,028 36.5%
91–95% 4,209 11.7% 8,961 13.2% 50,409 20.4%
71–90% 1,628 18.1% 3,249 19.1% 18,343 29.7%
51–70% 622 6.9% 961 5.6% 5,277 8.6%
0–50% 221 6.2% 210 3.1% 1,184 4.8%
Note: Data are annual expenditures of individuals pooled over 2009–11. Number of observations is
13,797,871 (aged 0–24), 25,624,847 (aged 25–64) and 7,886,528 (aged 65 and over). Figures are for
total personal health expenditures.
and 2011. On average, annual personal health expenditure is $4,398 per capita.
In the bottom half of the distribution, average spending is only $255. The half
of the populationwith the lowest levels of annual expenditure accounts for only
2.9 per cent of total expenditure. At the other extreme, average spending on
the 5 per cent most expensive cases is $52,766 and these observations account
for about 60 per cent of total expenditure.49
In the middle panel of Table 4, we exclude expenditure on long-term care
and examine the cross-sectional distribution of expenditure on medical care.
Spending on long-term care is particularly top-heavy – only 4.3 per cent of
the population make use of long-term care. Omitting these heavily-skewed
expenditures results in a distribution of medical expenditure that is somewhat
less concentrated at the top than that of total personal health expenditure. But
the 5 per cent most expensive medical cases still account for half of aggregate
medical spending. In the right-hand panel of Table 4, we restrict attention to
spending on hospital treatment. Since 43 per cent of the population experience
no hospital treatment in a given year, the distribution of hospital expenses is
more right-skewed than is the distribution of all medical spending. Average
hospital expenditure on the top twentieth of the population is $19,126 and they
account for 61.6 per cent of the aggregate of this category of expenditure.
In Table 5, we show the distribution of personal health expenditure that
is specific to three age groups. This again shows that average spending is
much higher on the elderly. But it also reveals differences in the distribution
of expenditure by age. Among the elderly, expenditures are much less
concentrated at the top of the distribution. The most expensive 5 per cent of
cases in the elderly population account for 36.5 per cent of aggregate spending
49Gender-specific distributions are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix.
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on this group. The respective figure for the non-elderly adult population is
59.1 per cent.50 The lower degree of concentration of health expenditures in
the elderly population is presumably due to a higher prevalence of (chronic)
illness and disability that is more evenly spread across the population. Among
the elderly, as for the full population, medical expenditures are more evenly
distributed than total health expenditures as a result of the very unequal
distribution of long-term care expenditures.51
2. Distribution by income
Table 6 shows the distribution of annual personal health expenditures by
quintile of equivalised gross household income calculated from the cross-
sectional data pooled across the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Expenditures on
all personal health care are strongly negatively correlated with income. On
average, the health spending on the poorest fifth of the population is $7,563
per person per year. This is more than three times the average spending on the
richest fifth. Average health spending on the poorest fifth is 43 per cent of the
average income of this group. For the richest fifth, average health expenditure
TABLE 6
Average income and health expenditures, by income quintile (US$ 2014 prices)
Income quintile Income Total health
expenditure
Medical
expenditure
Hospital
expenditure
Average
($)
% of
total
Average
($)
% of
total
Average
($)
% of
total
Average
($)
% of
total
All 47,705 100.0% 4,199 100.0% 2,797 100.0% 1,476 100.0%
Poorest 17,526 7.3% 7,563 36.0% 3,666 26.2% 1,798 24.4%
Second poorest 29,979 12.6% 5,320 25.3% 3,444 24.6% 1,821 24.7%
Middle 41,281 17.3% 3,239 15.4% 2,579 18.4% 1,388 18.8%
Second richest 55,190 23.1% 2,605 12.4% 2,253 16.1% 1,231 16.7%
Richest 94,550 39.6% 2,268 10.8% 2,043 14.6% 1,142 15.5%
Poorest/Richest 0.19 3.33 1.79 1.57
Note: Income is equivalised gross household income.Data are pooled over 2009–11.Number of observations
is 46,670,975. Total health expenditure is the sum of annual expenditures on medical care and long-term
care. Medical care in turn includes hospital care, outpatient medicine and other medical care, including
professional services. Hospital care includes inpatient and outpatient care and medicine that is prescribed
and administered at the hospital.
50The percentage of total expenditure on the top 5 per cent of the distribution is lower in each age group
than it is across all age groups (compare Tables 5 and 4). This is due to the much higher level of spending
on the elderly.
51See Table A3 in the online appendix.
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TABLE 7
Average income and personal health expenditures, by income quintile over age
groups (US$ 2014 prices)
Income quintile Aged 0–24 Aged 25–64 Aged 65 and over
Income Health
expenditure
Income Health
expenditure
Income Health
expenditure
All 43,049 1,794 53,511 3,355 36,510 11,556
Poorest 13,801 2,651 20,002 6,557 19,454 16,288
Second poorest 27,887 1,835 35,215 3,340 24,208 12,962
Middle 38,546 1,584 47,255 2,579 29,265 11,198
Second richest 50,539 1,495 61,712 2,263 38,464 9,247
Richest 84,474 1,408 103,370 2,035 71,160 8,086
Poorest/Richest 0.16 1.88 0.19 3.22 0.27 2.01
Note: Income is equivalised gross household income.Data are pooled over 2009–11.Number of observations
is 13,707,173 (aged 0–24), 25,404,960 (aged 25–64) and 7,558,842 (aged 65 and over). Personal health
expenditure is the sum of annual expenditures on medical care and long-term care.
is only 2.4 per cent of average income. The poorest fifth receive 7.3 per cent
of total gross income but get 36 per cent of all health spending.
The columns toward the right of Table 6 reveal that much of the income
gradient in health expenditures is driven by the distribution of long-term care.
Average expenditure on this type of care in the poorest income quintile is
17 times higher than the average in the richest quintile.52 An income gradient
in the distribution of medical expenditures is evident but much less marked.
Since contributions to public health and long-term care insurance increase
with earnings (up to contribution ceilings), this strong negative correlation
between care purchased from social insurance and income represents a
substantial redistribution from the rich to the poor in any given year. However,
given that health expenditures increase steeply with age, the cross-sectional
relationship between expenditures and income provides a highly misleading
impression of the redistribution achieved by social insurance from a lifetime
perspective.
The correlation between health expenditures and income is at most partly
driven by age, as the distributions of expenditures by income quintiles specific
to three age groups in Table 7 show.Within each age group, health expenditure
falls steeply as income rises. Even below the age of 25, the poorest fifth benefit
from spending equal to $2,651 on average, which is 88 per cent greater than
52There may be two explanations for this strong income gradient. First, there may be differences in
the prevalence and severity of disability by income. Second, the oldest old have accumulated much lower
(pension) incomes than younger cohorts, even when compared with younger retirees, and use the bulk of the
long-term care. Evidence based on Dutch survey data indicates that there is no income gradient in long-term
care use after controlling for disability and age (de Meijer et al., 2011; Bakx et al., 2015).
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that received by the richest fifth. Average health spending is 19 per cent of
average income for the poorest in this age group, compared with 1.7 per cent
for the richest. The income gradient in health expenditures is strongest for the
working-age population. It is likely that this is largely due to the large effect
that ill health has on income, through lost employment, before retirement.53 On
average, the poorest 20 per cent receive 3.2 times more spending than do the
richest in this age group. Average health spending on the poorest fifth of the
working-age population is a third of average income. For the poorest fifth of
the elderly, health spending is 84 per cent of average income. It is 11 per cent
even for the richest fifth of the elderly.
VI. The persistence of medical spending
In the cross-section, health expenditures are highly concentrated on the elderly,
the poor and high-cost cases. The concentration by age is consistent with social
health and long-term care insurance in the Netherlands effecting substantial
intrapersonal redistribution across the life cycle. The concentration by income
is consistent with substantial interpersonal redistribution. The concentration
of expenditures at the top of the distribution is consistent with welfare gains
from single-period insurance, but only if high expenditures are not predictable.
If there is substantial persistence in medical expenses, then social insurance
will play more of a redistributive role. The welfare gain it generates through
an insurance function will not be captured by a static single-period model
but will require adoption of a lifetime perspective in which the gains from
insuring the onset of chronic health conditions that persist once contracted
can be evaluated.54 In this section, we examine the serial correlation in health
expenditures with a view to assessing the extent to which the cross-section
concentration is likely to dissipate when the analysis is stretched to a somewhat
more distant horizon.
In Table 8, we show the linear correlation of individual health expenditures
in levels and logs one and two years apart.55 The correlation between spending
in one year and the next is high, at around 0.66 in both levels and logs. The
correlation between expenditure one year and that two years later is predictably
weaker but is still substantial, at 0.56 in levels and 0.61 in logs. Health spending
in one year appears to be a rather good predictor of spending up to two years
later. This suggests that the concentration of expenditure at the top of the
distribution does not arise from single-period risks that strike randomly in
53Van Kippersluis et al., 2010; Garcı´a-Go´mez et al., 2013.
54Kowalski, 2015.
55Attrition is not a major issue in the estimation of these correlations. Approximately 98 per cent of the
2009 observations are observed in 2010 and 97 per cent were observed also in 2011. Mortality and migration
are themain sources of attrition. Individuals observed in 2009 but not in 2010 had higher-than-average health
care expenditures.
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TABLE 8
Correlation of health expenditures in year t with expenditures in years t+1 and t+2
Spending in levels Spending in logs
t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2
Total health expenditure 0.66 0.56 0.67 0.61
Long-term care expenditure 0.82 0.70 0.88 0.79
Medical expenditure 0.43 0.33 0.60 0.53
Hospital expenditure 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.37
Number of observations 30,859,547 15,128,538 30,859,547 15,128,538
Note: Correlations between spending in year t and in year t+1 are calculated using pairs from the
years 2009–10 and 2010–11; correlations between year t and year t+2 are for the years 2009 and 2011.
Expenditures below 10 per cent of the mean have been set to that value when calculating log expenditures.
the population. To a substantial extent, it is the same individuals who are
repeatedly receiving treatment that is most costly.
Expenditures on long-term care display stronger serial correlation than do
medical expenditures. This is to be expected given the chronic nature of the
conditions that give rise to long-term care needs. The one-year and two-year
correlations of hospital expenditures are only slightly weaker than those for all
medical expenditures in levels, but they are substantially weaker in logs. The
latter is what one would anticipate given that hospital expenses are more likely
to be incurred for acute treatments that are not repeated, unlike the continued
medication and primary care management of chronic conditions.
From the transition matrices presented in Table 9, it is apparent that the
serial correlation is strongest toward the extremes of the distribution of health
expenditure. Three-fifths of the individuals located in the highest quintile of
expenditure in one year remain in that quintile in the subsequent year. Of those
who drop out of the top quintile, more than half move to the second-highest
quintile. Only 18.3 per cent fall out of the top two-fifths of the distribution of
health expenditures from one year to the next. Strikingly, more than half of
those in the top fifth of the distribution were still there two years later. High
levels of expenditure are rather persistent, at least over a three-year period.
There is also a good deal of consistency at the bottom of the distribution.
Half of those in the bottom quintile of health expenditure in one year remain
there in the next. Only 4 per cent of individuals in the lowest fifth of the
distribution in one year move to the highest quintile in the next, and only
6 per cent move from the bottom to the top within two years. These figures
provide an indication of the rarity of health shocks that shunt an individual
from the bottom to the top of the distribution of health expenditures.
The less persistence there is in health expenditures, the greater will be
the reduction in concentration in their distribution when expenditures are
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TABLE 9
Transition matrices for total personal health expenditures
One-year transitions
Quintile in
current year
Quintile next year
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Bottom 51.3 23.7 13.1 7.5 4.4
Second 22.5 36.3 23.0 12.1 6.1
Third 12.1 23.5 33.2 20.9 10.3
Fourth 6.6 11.7 22.1 38.8 20.8
Top 3.5 5.5 9.3 21.5 60.2
Two-year transitions
Quintile in
current year
Quintile two years ahead
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Bottom 46.2 24.3 14.4 9.2 6.0
Second 22.4 33.5 22.8 13.5 7.8
Third 12.9 23.8 30.3 21.2 11.8
Fourth 7.5 13.2 22.0 35.1 22.2
Top 4.6 6.9 10.5 21.9 56.2
Note: Cells indicate the percentage of individuals in row quintile i in year t who are in column quintile j in
year t+1 (top panel) or t+2 (bottom panel). Total personal health expenditure is all expenditure on medical
care and long-term care. Number of observations is 30,859,547 for the top panel and 15,128,538 for the
bottom one.
averaged over more years. The Lorenz curves for total health expenditures
presented in Figure 6 show little evidence of this, once again confirming a high
degree of persistence.56 The curve for expenditures in one year is close to a
reverse L shape, reflecting the very high degree of concentration, or inequality,
demonstrated in the previous section.
This is also evident from the measures of concentration presented in the
top panel of Table 10. The 10 per cent most expensive cases account for three-
quarters of total expenditure in a year. The top 1 per cent account for a quarter.
The corresponding Gini index is an astronomical 0.82.57
The Lorenz curves for two- and three-year averaged expenditures move
inward, indicating less inequality, but only marginally. Over three years, the
fraction of total personal health expenditure spent on the top percentile of the
population is still substantially more than a fifth and the Gini index falls only
five hundredths to 0.77.
56Figure A1 in the online appendix presents the distributions in the form of cumulative density functions.
57The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality. It is bounded between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to
perfect equality and 1 corresponds to maximum inequality.
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FIGURE 6
Lorenz curves for health expenditures for one, two and three years of expenditures
Note: Number of observations is 47,309,246 (one year), 30,859,547 (two years) and 15,107,038 (three
years). Personal health care is all medical care and long-term care. Medical care includes hospital care,
outpatient medicine and other medical care, including professional services. Hospital care includes inpatient
and outpatient care and medicine that is prescribed and administered at the hospital.
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TABLE 10
Measures of the concentration of personal health expenditures over one, two and
three years
Expenditure averaged over:
1 year 2 years 3 years
Total personal health expenditure
Gini coefficient for spending 0.82 0.79 0.77
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 24.6% 22.7% 22.0%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 74.0% 70.4% 68.3%
Long-term care expenditure
Gini coefficient for spending 0.98 0.98 0.98
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 56.4% 54.4% 53.5%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Medical expenditure
Gini coefficient for spending 0.77 0.72 0.70
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 23.8% 20.1% 18.3%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 65.2% 59.6% 56.5%
Hospital expenditure
Gini coefficient for spending 0.86 0.81 0.78
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 29.8% 24.0% 21.2%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 77.4% 69.1% 64.5%
Number of observations 47,309,246 30,859,547 15,107,038
Note: Data are expenditures of individuals pooled over 2009–11.
The Lorenz curves for medical expenditures, and particularly hospital
expenditures, move inward to a greater extent than that for total health
expenditures as the number of years of expenditure is increased. This indicates
that these types of expenditure display less persistence than the remaining
category, which is expenditure on long-term care. The very high degree of
concentration and persistence of long-term care expenditures is evident from
the second panel of Table 10. The top 1 per cent of the distribution account
for more than half of these expenditures even over a three-year period. Of
course, this is due to long-term care being used almost exclusively by the
elderly and the steep increase in expenditure on this type of care at the most
advanced ages. Over a period substantially longer than three years, the degree
of persistence in long-term care expenditures would fall dramatically.
In general, there is a good deal of persistence in all types of health
expenditure. Even for hospital expenditures, which one expects to be most
acute and least persistent, the Gini coefficient calculated from the three-year
averages is only eight hundredths less than that for the single year of data. The
1 per cent of individuals with the highest three-year average hospital expenses
account for more than a fifth of spending over the three-year period.
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TABLE 11
Correlation of total personal health expenditure in year t with expenditure in years
t+1 and t+2, by age
Spending in levels Spending in logs Number of observations
t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2 t versus t+1 t versus t+2
All 0.66 0.56 0.67 0.61 30,859,547 15,128,538
Aged 0–24 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.38 8,707,666 4,123,040
Aged 25–64 0.65 0.57 0.60 0.53 16,840,457 8,303,905
Aged 65 and over 0.68 0.57 0.73 0.66 5,311,424 2,701,593
Note:Correlations between spending in year t and in year t+1 are calculated using pairs from the years 2009–
10 and 2010–11; correlations between year t and year t+2 are for the years 2009 and 2011. Expenditures
below 10 per cent of the mean have been set to that value when calculating log expenditures.
While we find that there is a high degree of persistence in health
expenditures over a three-year period, over a longer period there will inevitably
be more intertemporal relative to interpersonal variability. Wong et al.
(2016) use a non-parametric resampling method to simulate lifetime medical
expenditures from Dutch public health insurance claims data for the period
1997–2005. They calculate a Gini index of 0.35 for lifetime expenditures.
This is half of the value we estimate for three-year averages for medical
expenditures. The distribution of lifetime expenditures is substantially less
concentrated than is the cross-sectional distribution. But a Gini of 0.35 is
still indicative of a substantial degree of inequality.58 Over a lifetime, the
medical expenditures of some individuals are substantially greater than those of
others.
We can get a partial picture of the contribution of age differences in spending
to the persistence of health expenditures over a three-year period by repeating
the analysis by age group. In Table 11, we show the serial correlation of total
health expenditure for three age groups. Table 12 shows the equivalent of the
top panel of Table 10 for each age group. Together, these tables show that
health spending is somewhat more persistent among the elderly than among
the young and the working-age populations. The correlation between spending
in year t and spending in years t+1 and t+2 is weakest for the youngest group.
This suggests, as would be expected, that the degree of chronicity of illnesses
and disabilities is higher at older ages. When moving from annual spending to
multi-year averages, the shares spent on the top 1 per cent and the top 10 per cent
of the distribution, and to some extent the Gini coefficient, decrease less for
the population aged 65 and over than they do for the younger age groups. But
even at younger ages, there seems to be a good deal of persistence. For both
58Compare, for example, with a Gini index of 0.25 for equivalised disposable income in a single year in
the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2015).
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TABLE 12
Measures of the concentration of total personal health expenditure over one, two and
three years, by age
Total personal health expenditure averaged over:
1 year 2 years 3 years
Aged 0–24
Gini coefficient for spending 0.77 0.72 0.70
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 35.9% 33.0% 31.3%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 68.9% 63.7% 61.3%
Number of observations 13,797,871 8,707,666 4,115,876
Aged 25–64
Gini coefficient for spending 0.81 0.78 0.76
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 29.9% 27.9% 27.0%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 72.2% 67.6% 65.5%
Number of observations 25,624,847 16,840,457 8,290,358
Aged 65 and over
Gini coefficient for spending 0.72 0.70 0.68
Percentage spent on top 1% of cases 10.5% 9.6% 9.6%
Percentage spent on top 10% of cases 56.9% 54.3% 53.5%
Number of observations 7,886,528 5,311,424 2,700,804
Note: Data are expenditures of individuals pooled over 2009–11.
of the younger groups, the percentage of total expenditure absorbed by the top
10 per cent falls by only around 7 percentage points in moving from one year
to three years of expenditure and the fraction remains above 60 per cent over
the three-year period for both.
VII. Conclusion
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, the greater part of annual health
expenditures is concentrated on a relatively small fraction of the population.
Moreover, there is a very high degree of persistence in these expenditures,
especially among individuals with high expenditures, at least over a three-year
period.
Expenditures are concentrated among the old and the dying. This needs to be
borne in mind when interpreting the high degree of persistence in expenditures
we find over a period of three years. If the horizon of the analysis could
be stretched further, then there would be substantially less concentration and
persistence. Therefore, one should not rush to conclude that the evidence
presented here implies that social health insurance in the Netherlands mainly
effects interpersonal redistribution from the rich and healthy to the poor and
persistently unhealthy. It also facilitates intrapersonal reallocation fromperiods
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in good health to periods, and indeed ages, in bad health. But the degree
of persistence that we observe over a period of three years does point to
a very large proportion of expenditure on conditions that are chronic. It is
difficult to insure the risks associated with the onset of such conditions through
unregulated private markets and a large part of the welfare gain from social
insurance may arise from the provision of such insurance.59
About a third of the aggregate health expenditures in the Netherlands are
on long-term care. These expenditures are strongly concentrated on the elderly
and the dying. Long-term care spending accounts for more than half of all
health expenditures incurred in caring for individuals in their last year of life.
The comprehensive social long-term care insurance in the Netherlands has
led to particularly high expenditures on long-term care.60 The Netherlands has
a relatively high share of the elderly living in nursing homes,61 which are
the most expensive type of long-term care. High spending on long-term care
contributes to a greater concentration of health expenditures on the very old and
dying than in other countries and will also contribute to a high concentration
on the very high-cost cases. Universal long-term care insurance would also
be expected to have implications for wealth accumulation by reducing the
need to hold precautionary savings against the risk of care needs in old age.
Indeed, many Dutch households hold only a very small amount of liquid
assets.62
Health expenditures are very strongly negatively correlated with income
in the Netherlands. This is not simply an age effect. In part, it is a reflection
of the interpersonal redistribution achieved by social health insurance. But
one should not forget that health expenditures are made in response to illness,
and ill health also impacts on income through the loss of employment. The
concentration of health expenditures on those with low incomes can therefore
be consistent with the provision of insurance that covers the medical expenses
of those losing earnings capacity due to disease and disability.
All in all, it seems that universal and very comprehensive social
insurance coverage achieves a great deal of interpersonal and intrapersonal
redistribution. The high degree of interpersonal redistribution indicates that, in
the Netherlands, the practice is not to ‘go Dutch’ when paying for health and
long-term care. The redistributive effect is strengthened by the high level of
health spending – second only to the US in the OECD. It remains to be seen
whether this level of spending and redistribution will prove to be sustainable
in the coming decades as the share of the elderly in the population rises.
59Kowalski, 2015.
60OECD, 2011.
61OECD, 2015.
62Van Ooijen, Alessie and Kalwij, 2014.
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Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
paper on the publisher’s website:
 Appendix: Tables A1–A3 and Figure A1
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